I. Introduction
While bachelor's degree attainment rates have risen substantially in other countries over the past three decades, they have barely budged in the United States (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007) . Those who do earn degrees are taking longer to do so (Turner 2004; Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 2010) . National figures also mask considerable variation in attainment at the state level. Statistics from the 2000 Census show that only 16 percent of those born in the lowest-ranked state of West Virginia (age 25 and older) had attained a bach- Dynarski, Brian Jacob, Christopher Jencks, and elor's degree-well below the national rate of 24 percent, and comparable to the U.S. average from the late 1970s.
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It is not entirely obvious, however, which policy options are most likely to increase college attainment. Although much research and policy has focused on increasing college enrollments (see Dynarski 2002 for a review of this literature), entry alone is no guarantee of success. Only 36 percent of all college entrants complete a bachelor's degree within six years and a mere 18 percent complete within four years.
1 There is no consensus on why so many entrants fail to complete a degree, or fail to complete on time, but policy debates have often focused on concerns either about students' financial constraints or their academic preparation/motivation.
These joint concerns may explain the increasing popularity of programs offering large financial incentives for college achievement. These programs simultaneously reduce the cost of college, and provide clear inducements for student effort. At least 14 states have introduced large-scale merit-based college scholarship programs since 1991, requiring students to meet academic criteria both in order to initially qualify and to renew the awards each year.
2 West Virginia joined this group in 2002 with the inauguration of the PROMISE scholarship, which provided free tuition and fees at any state public institution for qualified students, but only as long as they maintained a minimum GPA and course load during college.
Large merit-based scholarships such as West Virginia's PROMISE may affect outcomes among eligible college enrollees via two mechanisms: cost-of-college effects and incentive effects. The PROMISE scholarship is a high-value award, worth up to four years of free in-state tuition.
3 First, even without any academic incentives, it still might enable some financially constrained students to enroll full-time rather than part-time, or to attend for more semesters than they would have otherwise. Lowering the cost of college also might reduce student employment, thus enabling students to spend more time on their coursework, raise their GPAs and accelerate their progress towards a degree. 4 Second, even among the financially unconstrained, PROMISE generates direct incentives to increase academic effort by establishing annual achievement requirements for renewal. Why might such external motivation be needed? State-subsidized tuition and parent support mean that few students pay the full cost of an additional year of schooling. PROMISE may help resolve this principal-agent problem by aligning students' incentives with their funders' preferences. Annual incentives also may help students overcome a human tendency to procrastinate, particularly on actions with upfront costs and delayed benefits.
Although previous research shows that merit-based aid, like traditional financial aid, can increase college enrollments (Kane 2003; Dynarski 2004; Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006) , the scant evidence on outcomes beyond initial enrollment has been mixed. Dynarski (2008) estimates that large-scale merit-aid programs in Arkansas and Georgia reduced the college dropout rate by three to five percentage points. But if Georgia's program increased persistence, it may also have lengthened time-to-degree: Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find that the Georgia HOPE scholarship reduced the fraction of freshmen at the University of Georgia completing a full course load by six percentage points. One recent experiment with merit-based scholarships (up to $2,000) for low-income community college students finds positive and significant effects on full-time enrollment and credit accumulation over the first three semesters (Brock and Richburg-Hayes 2006) , but another recent experiment offering even larger merit-based awards (up to $5,000) at a large public Canadian university found essentially no effects for the full sample over the first two years (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009) . 5 Importantly, no previous study has attempted to disentangle the mechanisms underlying observed effects.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the effects of a large financial incentive program, West Virginia's PROMISE scholarship, on postenrollment outcomes from semester-level GPAs and credits accumulated to degree completion five years later. I utilize two complementary quasi-experimental approaches to identify causal effects. The first is a regression-discontinuity (RD) analysis based on the college entrance test score cutoff for initial PROMISE eligibility. The second approach is a cohort analysis based on the discontinuous timing of program implementation. The primary threat to identification under either approach is differential selection into the West Virginia college system. In addition to controlling for an extremely rich set of covariates, I address this concern directly using a bounding exercise in the spirit of Lee bounds (2009) .
To preview the results, I find significant positive effects on a range of outcomes. The RD and the cohort analysis generate broadly similar results, and the bounding exercise shows that the impacts are too large to be explained by differential selection. I find compelling evidence that cost-of-college effects alone cannot explain the results. Impacts are strongly concentrated around the specific annual achievement thresholds for PROMISE renewal, particularly the course load requirements. For example, at the end of the freshman year, PROMISE recipients were nearly 25 percentage points more likely to have earned 30 or more credits, the threshold for PROMISE renewal. Tellingly, the annual impacts are roughly constant in the freshman through junior years, but virtually disappear in the fourth year while students are still receiving PROMISE funds but no longer have the opportunity to renew. I conclude that a traditional grant with no strings attached would not produce the same pattern of effects. Money may very well be necessary, but insufficient to improve college outcomes.
Section II describes the PROMISE scholarship and the dataset in detail. Section III presents the empirical strategy and main results. Section IV focuses on bounding the potential bias due to selection. Section V investigates whether PROMISE works primarily by reducing the cost of college or by providing specific incentives for achievement. Section VI discusses the results and implications for future research.
5. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) do find positive effects for women who were offered extra student services in addition to the financial incentive.
II. West Virginia's PROMISE Scholarship
In 2002, West Virginia began offering PROMISE (Providing Real Opportunities to Maximize In-state Student Excellence) scholarships to promote academic achievement and encourage qualified students to stay in the state for college and, hopefully, beyond. The PROMISE scholarship covers full tuition and required fees for up to four years for eligible first-time freshmen who enroll full-time at a West Virginia public two-or four-year institution, or an "equivalent amount" at an eligible West Virginia private institution.
6 Full-time enrollment is defined as a minimum of 12 credit-hours per semester.
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Eligibility for the scholarship is based entirely on a student's academic record, not financial need. Incoming freshmen must have a 3.0 high school grade point average (GPA) both overall and within a set of "core courses." They also must have scored at least a 21 overall on the ACT or 1000 on the SAT. 8 West Virginia estimates that approximately 23 percent of their high school graduates (or about 40 percent of their in-state first-time freshmen) meet the initial eligibility requirements.
9 Thus, PROMISE recipients are not the academic elite, but neither are they average students. To renew the scholarship, undergraduates must successfully complete at least 30 credits per year and maintain a 3.0 cumulative GPA, although they are allowed a 2.75 GPA in their first year. Those who fail to meet renewal requirements once cannot later regain the scholarship. In the first two PROMISE cohorts, approximately 75 percent renewed the scholarship for a second year and approximately 50 percent retained the scholarship for four years. The average value of the award in 2002-2003 was $2,900 for the first year. Those who initially qualified received an average of about $10,000 in PROMISE funds over four years.
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The West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission (WVHEPC) is a state agency that maintains a comprehensive database on the state's public college enrollees, and provided de-identified data on four cohorts of new entrants under a restricted-use data agreement (2000 -2001 through 2003-2004) . The data include limited background information such as age, race, gender, overall high school GPA, and ACT and SAT scores if applicable.
11 No direct measure of family income or wealth is available for the full sample. The data include complete college transcripts and financial aid records for five years after initial enrollment. The data also include administrative records of quarterly employment and earnings for students who worked in-state, acquired by WVHEPC from the state's Employment Security agency. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 6. This paper focuses on the first two cohorts of PROMISE recipients. Eligibility rules have changed since then, and in early 2009, awards were limited to a fixed dollar amount. 7. Credit hours are roughly intended to correspond to the number of hours of class time per week. Regular courses are typically worth three to four credits per semester. 8. Composite ACT scores average four subject scores and round to the nearest whole number. 9. Phone conversation with Jack Toney, Director of State Financial Aid Programs, April 17, 2008 and author's calculations based on WV college entrants age 19 or younger. 10. This average includes students who failed to renew the scholarship for all four years. 11. More than 90 percent of students took the ACT and approximately 15 percent took the SAT. For those that took both exams, the higher score is used to determine eligibility. 
III. Impacts on College Persistence, Performance and Completion
I utilize two complementary quasi-experimental strategies to identify causal effects: the first is a regression-discontinuity (RD) that estimates the effect of being just above rather than just below the test score threshold for initial eligibility; and the second approach is a cohort analysis based on the discontinuous timing of program implementation. The two approaches are much stronger together than either would be alone. The advantage of the RD is that it tightly links any observed impacts to an arbitrary program rule, eliminating several alternative explanations for the findings. Neither institutional policies, labor market conditions, nor students' background characteristics should vary discontinuously around the ACT threshold. The major limitations of the RD are that it estimates impacts only for those near the eligibility threshold, who represent only about 20 percent of all PROMISE recipients and who may differ from other students in their response to the program. In addition, because the threshold was known, the RD may be sensitive to differential selection around the cutoff.
The advantage of the cohort analysis, which compares similar students just before and after the implementation of PROMISE, is that it estimates the average treatment effects across all recipients, not just those near the threshold. These results may be less sensitive to selection concerns (discussed below), and if credible, are more useful than the RD findings. The drawback of this approach is that I have data for only two cohorts before and two cohorts after PROMISE. Without the RD, one might wonder whether any differences are truly attributable to the program, rather than to preexisting trends, idiosyncratic variation in labor market conditions or institutional policies that just happened to coincide with PROMISE implementation.
Selection bias is the primary threat to validity in either approach. The analysis focuses on college enrollees, but the program may influence who becomes an eligible enrollee in the first place. Indeed, encouraging more students to meet eligibility thresholds and attend college in-state were explicit goals of the program. Selection bias could arise from three sources: (1) individuals who otherwise would have attended college out-of-state could choose to enroll in-state (potentially inducing upward bias in both the RD and cohort analysis), (2) individuals who otherwise would not have enrolled in college could choose to do so (likely to negatively bias both analyses), and (3) individuals who would have enrolled in college but failed to meet the eligibility criteria could work harder in order to reach them (likely to negatively bias the cohort analysis, but bias is ambiguous in the RD).
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I address these concerns explicitly with a bounding exercise, in the spirit of Lee (2009) , after presenting the main results. For the moment, I simply note that all specifications control for two of the best predictors of college success-high school GPA and ACT score-as well as gender, race/ethnicity, and age at entry. Differential selection is only a concern to the extent it occurs on other unmeasured dimensions. Moreover, as explained above, the net effect of these compositional changes is a priori unclear.
A. Identification Based on Regression Discontinuity (RD) Around the ACT Eligibility Threshold
For this analysis, I limit the sample to West Virginia residents entering in the first two years after PROMISE implementation who earned at least a 3.0 high school GPA. 13 For these students PROMISE receipt is largely determined by ACT score 12. A particular concern is that students may retake the ACT until they achieve the required score. On average, about 36 percent of ACT test-takers repeat the test at least once (Andrews and Ziomek 1998) . Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) find that the prevalence of retesting (at least with respect to the SAT at three selective college) places low-income and African-American students at a disadvantage because these groups are less likely to retest, all else equal. Note that if the best-achieving students just below the ACT threshold exert additional effort to become the lowest-achieving students just above the threshold, mean outcome levels on both side of the threshold would fall. The direction of bias resulting from such a shift could be positive in the RD, but is not necessarily so. 13. One also could use the GPA cutoff for an RD analysis. In practice, however, the GPA requirement is rarely decisive. Among those meeting the GPA requirement, scaling the ACT threshold increases PROMISE receipt by 70 percentage points, but among those meeting the ACT requirement, scaling the GPA threshold increases PROMISE receipt by only 13 to 25 percentage points, depending on bandwidth. Students near the GPA threshold are at much higher risk of being disqualified based on their "core course GPA," which is unobservable to me. ACT (or equivalent)
Figure 1 Actual PROMISE Receipt by ACT Score
Source: Author's calculations using WVHEPC data. Notes: Each circle indicates the rate of PROMISE receipt for students with a given ACT score, with the size of the dots reflecting the distribution of students across ACT scores.
(or SAT equivalent), though grades in high school "core courses" is another factor (which, unfortunately, I do not observe). The vast majority of those who score a 20.50 (and thus are rounded to a score of 21) have access to the program while those who score only 20.49 do not. Except for PROMISE, students scoring just above 20.5 should not systematically differ from those scoring just below. If this assumption holds, then one can examine outcomes by ACT score and attribute any discontinuous jumps at the threshold to the effects of PROMISE. Figure 1 confirms that PROMISE receipt increases by about 70 percent for those just above the ACT score cutoff. About 7 percent of those just below the eligibility threshold received PROMISE, and about 23 percent of those just above the threshold did not. Note that these apparent discrepancies are due to imperfect measurement of eligibility, not imperfect take-up among the truly eligible. Though I limit the sample to students with a 3.0 overall high school GPA, students are also required to have earned a 3.0 high school GPA within a set of "core courses." I do not observe this "core course" GPA, so not everyone above the threshold is truly eligible. In addition, the ACT score itself is imperfectly reported, which may explain discrepancies both Source: Author's calculations using WVHEPC data.
Graphical Analysis
above and below the cutoff. 14 It is implausible that much of the discrepancy above the threshold is driven by truly eligible students choosing to enroll in college but failing to take up the scholarship. The program was introduced with great fanfare, highly publicized, simple to understand, and required minimal paperwork. Moreover, even students who missed the deadline or only learned about PROMISE upon college enrollment could apply late and still receive funding in the spring term.
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Figures 2 and 3 plot the raw means of end-of-college outcomes by ACT score, along with linear predictions. Figure 2 shows no discontinuities in the number of semesters of enrollment over four years (a measure of persistence) or in typical 14. I have one set of scores per student, as reported by individual institutions from their college application data, but PROMISE eligibility is officially determined by scores obtained directly from the relevant testing agency. If a student took the test more than once, this could introduce conflicts, as could errors in the application data. For example, college applications often allow students to report results from more than one test, but the WVHEPC data only allow for one set of results. In some cases the first or last score may be recorded rather than the highest score. 15. Though eligible students must submit the federal financial aid form (the FAFSA) and enroll full-time to claim PROMISE, the discrepancy above the threshold persists even if I limit the sample to FAFSA filers who enrolled full-time. It is particularly implausible that a truly eligible student would enroll full-time and take up federal student aid, while simultaneously declining PROMISE. weekly school-year earnings, but indicates perceptible-if-modest discontinuities in total credits and cumulative GPA at the end of four years. 16 The four panels of Figure 3 show clear and substantively important discontinuities in the percent of students meeting key credit and GPA thresholds after four years as well as in fourand five-year BA completion rates.
Estimation
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , I use a two-stage local linear regression specification in which I first predict PROMISE receipt using the test score discontinuity, and then estimate the effect of predicted receipt on a given outcome:
16. Typical weekly school-year earnings are based on the largest subset of data available for the full sample, including the sophomore spring semester (January-March), junior fall and spring semesters (October-March) and senior year fall semester (October-December). All earnings data are inflated to 2007 dollars. For the cumulative GPA measure, students who were not enrolled at the end of four years are assigned the cumulative GPA as of last enrollment.
where P i represents actual PROMISE receipt, represents predicted PROMISÊ P i receipt, above i is an indicator that the student is above the threshold, below i is an indicator that the student is below the threshold, ACTdist i is the distance between the student's individual score and the underlying cutoff score (20.5), X i is a vector of covariates including gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and high school GPA squared, and is an idiosyncratic error term. 17 The parameter ␤ estimates the ε i difference in outcomes at the threshold. Intuitively, the equation above approximates the prediction lines shown in Figures 2 and 3 , except that the estimates are adjusted for small differences in covariates and scaled up by a factor of 1.43 (that is, 1.00/ 0.70) to account for the fact that crossing the ACT threshold increases PROMISE receipt by 70 percentage points.
Results
The baseline results are shown in Column 1 of Table 2 . Confirming the graphical analysis, PROMISE receipt has no significant impact on persistence (semesters enrolled, over four years), nor on typical weekly school-year earnings for students near the ACT threshold. Note that these are the two measures one might have expected to be most sensitive to reductions in college costs. Conditional on full-time enrollment, the direct marginal cost of taking additional courses is zero for most students with or without PROMISE (in West Virginia, as in many other states, full-time students are charged a flat tuition rate so even outside of PROMISE, additional courses are free). Yet the program appears to have substantial impacts on cumulative GPA and total credits earned in the first year as well as moderate impacts on these outcomes after four years: total credits increase by 2.1 after the first year (equivalent to one-half to two-thirds of a course) and 4.6 after four years, while cumulative GPA increases by 0.16 after the first year (from an average near the threshold of 2.52) and 0.10, or about one-tenth of a letter grade, after four years.
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The program also appears to have large effects on the percentage of students meeting key achievement thresholds. PROMISE recipients were 9.5 percentage points more likely to have completed 120 credits after four years (four times the 30-credit annual requirement of PROMISE and generally a bare minimum requirement for a BA). They were also nine percentage points more likely to have a 3.0 cumulative GPA. Finally, PROMISE generates large and statistically significant impacts on BA completion. Four-year BA completion rates rise by 9.4 percentage points from a baseline near the threshold of just 16 percent. Five-year BA completion rises by 4.5 percentage points from a baseline of 37 percent. The difference between 17. Lee and Card (2008) suggest clustering standard errors by values of the forcing variable (ACT score, in this case) when the forcing variable is discrete rather than continuous. This procedure is not clearly an improvement here due to the unbalanced size and small number of clusters (10) and universally reduces the estimated standard errors. Clustering by high school county-by-year also slightly reduces the standard errors; thus, I present the robust unclustered estimates. 18. Note that the GPA increases are not readily explained by grade inflation, as instructors at large public institutions are unlikely to know who is just above or just below the PROMISE threshold. a. For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. b. I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment.
the four-and five-year impacts suggests that PROMISE not only increases graduation rates, but also reduces time-to-degree. I utilized the same LLR specification (but with no controls) to test for significant differences in covariates around the cutoff (not shown in table). There are no differences in percent female, age at entry, or average first-year Pell Grant. Although those above the cutoff have statistically significantly higher high school GPAs, the difference is substantively very small, measuring only 0.034 of a GPA point, from a mean GPA near the cutoff of 3.46.
Robustness Checks
Table 2 also shows that these results are highly robust to alternative specifications. First, I test whether the results are robust to the inclusion of additional background controls: an indicator of whether the student graduated from a private high school (as well as an indicator for whether the high school type was unknown) and a set of 55 indicators for the student's county of residence at entry. 19 This has virtually no effect on the estimates. Next, I test whether the results are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth (that is, the range of ACT scores included in the analysis). As one might have predicted from the graphical analysis, the estimates fluctuate very little. Third, I test whether the results are sensitive to the choice of functional form. In Column 5 of Table 2 , I estimate a two-stage model identical to Equations 2a and 2b, except for the addition of two quadratic terms for ACTdist i , one for each side of the threshold. These local quadratic results indicate no systematic differences with the local linear specification, other than a noticeable increase in the standard errors. Finally, Column 6 shows a falsification check in which I reestimate the baseline RD specification using students who entered prior to 2002, before PROMISE was available. 20 As expected, no impacts are found. Figure 4 shows the density of enrollments in the WV system by ACT score before and after PROMISE. After PROMISE, there is a spike in the number of students with scores at or above the cutoff score. A formal test of the continuity of the density function following McCrary (2008) indicates that the discontinuity is indeed significant, raising the possibility of differential selection. 21 The consequences of differential selection will be estimated directly via a bounding exercise, after presenting the results from the cohort analysis. For the moment, I simply note that it is reas-19. These controls are not in the baseline specification for two reasons: 1) almost as many students are missing high school type (1.6 percent of this sample) as attended a private high school (2.6 percent); 2) controlling for county of residence at entry may unintentionally control for some effects of the program, if students move near their intended college prior to entry. 20. Because none of these students received PROMISE, I test the impact of estimated eligibility. 21. This test is implemented via local linear regression using the density (by ACT score bins) after PROM-ISE as the dependent variable and a bandwidth of 10. The estimated jump in the density at ACT‫12ס‬ is 3.4 percent (p‫.)200.ס‬ Given that the density at ACT‫12ס‬ is 15.5, this suggests that up to 3.4/(15.5-‫82ס)4.3‬ percent of those just above the cutoff may be "marginal" students.
Limitations

Figure 4 Density of ACT Scores, Before and After PROMISE Implementation
Source: Author's calculations using WVHEPC data.
suring that there are no substantively significant discontinuities in observable characteristics around the threshold.
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B. Identification Based on Timing of Program Implementation
For this analysis, I limit the sample to 12,911 enrollees meeting both the high school GPA and ACT score requirements for PROMISE who entered in the two cohorts just before (2000-2001 and 2001-2002) and just after (2002-2003 and 2003-2004) the program was implemented.
Graphical Analysis
Simple plots of cohort means reveal discontinuous increases in college outcomes (a decrease in the case of school-year earnings) between 2001 and 2002, rather than steady increases over time, lessening the concern that before-after differences simply 22. One reader asked how it could be that there would be no noticeable differences in covariates in the presence of such a noticeable discontinuity in the density function. As will be discussed in the bounding exercise, even when there is significant selection into the program, the marginal enrollees still represent a minority of program beneficiaries (see footnote above), so differences in their covariates must be rather extreme to affect the cell means. reflect broad underlying trends. See Figure 5 . Similar plots of covariates (not shown), including average high school GPA and ACT scores, indicate no noticeable changes around the implementation of PROMISE.
Estimation
A regression framework enables me to adjust the raw differences for any observable changes in sample composition. The basic OLS specification estimates:
where i indexes individuals, t indexes entry cohorts, after t is an indicator variable equal to one for the 2002 and 2003 entry cohorts and zero for earlier cohorts, X i is a vector of individual covariates including gender, race/ethnicity, high school GPA, high school GPA squared, and a set of indicator variables for each ACT score.
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Although treatment status generally varies at the individual level, once the sample is restricted to academically qualified individuals, the treatment varies only by cohort. This suggests that standard errors should be clustered by cohort to account for common shocks: v t is the group-specific error term and is an idiosyncratic error ε it term. Despite the small number of clusters, clustering by cohort and using critical values from the appropriate small sample T-distribution produces the most conservative estimates of statistical significance relative to alternative plausible clustering approaches in this case. 24 In a further robustness check, I show that the results persist even when data are aggregated to cohort means and the entire analysis is run with the resulting four cohort-level observations. Equation 2 estimates the effects of predicted PROMISE eligibility, not the effects of actual PROMISE receipt. Because eligibility status is imperfectly measured (as discussed above), only 86 percent of apparently eligible enrollees in the PROMISE cohorts actually receive PROMISE funds. An IV specification estimates the causal effect of actual PROMISE receipt, using after t as the plausibly exogenous instrument. I estimate the two-stage model:
where P it represents actual PROMISE receipt, represents predicted PROMISÊ P it receipt based on the parameter estimates from Equation 3a, and all other variables are as previously defined. The OLS estimates are of less interest, but are provided for comparison.
23. For the 10 percent taking the SAT instead, scores are first converted to ACT scores. Given the small number scoring 27 or higher, a single indicator variable is included for this group. 24. Because cluster-robust standard errors may be biased when the number of clusters is small, I computed standard errors under several alternative approaches, including no clustering, clustering by high school county, or clustering by county-year (note that clustering by school is not appropriate because school choice is a post-treatment outcome). Clustering by year provides the most conservative estimates of significance.
Figure 5
Selected Outcomes by Cohort, for Entrants Who Would Qualify for PROMISE Table 3 presents the estimates from Equations 2 and 3b, along with baseline means and raw differences for comparison. For most outcomes, adding controls slightly increases the magnitude of the estimates (comparing the OLS results in Column 3 to Column 2). This suggests that at least along observable dimensions, eligible enrollees are a slightly less high-achieving group after the implementation of PROM-ISE. The IV scales up the OLS estimates by a factor of 1.17 (that is, 1.00/0.86).
During the freshman year, PROMISE recipients earned 1.8 additional credits and 0.08 additional GPA points (both statistically significant). At the end of four years, the GPA effects dissipate but recipients had earned nearly six more credits on average (about a 6 percent increase) and earned about $10 per week less during the school year, slightly more than a 10 percent reduction. As in the RD, effects at key thresholds are larger than average effects. The percentage of students who had earned at least 120 credits after four years rose by 11 percentage points (from a baseline of 43 percent) and four-year BA completion rates increase by nearly seven percentage points (from a baseline of just 27 percent). Also as in the RD, some of the BA completion impact attenuates over time, leaving a still statistically significant impact of 3.7 percentage points after five years (from a baseline rate of 51 percent).
Robustness Checks
I first examine whether the findings are robust to analysis at the cohort level rather than the individual level. Running the analysis with only four cohort-level observations reduces estimated significance levels, but several key impacts remain strongly significant, including the increases in first year GPA and credits, total credits over four years, and four-year graduation, as well as the decline in school-year earnings (the five-year graduation impact is no longer significant at traditional levels).
In Column 2 I test whether the cohort analysis is robust to controlling for students' high school type (public or private) and 55 indicators for county of residence at entry. The results are virtually identical to the baseline estimates in Column 1. In Column 3, I explicitly control for a linear time trend in order to focus on breaks from trend at the year of implementation. This would be the preferred specification with a longer time series, but with only four cohorts it is more appropriate as a sensitivity test. These estimates are larger than the baseline results.
Finally, I test whether the findings from the cohort analysis are robust to the inclusion of comparison groups, to account for any secular changes in outcomes over this time period. First, I estimate a difference-in-difference (DD) model in which I compare the changes among PROMISE-eligible enrollees to changes among out-of-state students enrolled in West Virginia who met the academic eligibility requirements but could not receive PROMISE due to their residency status. Out-ofstate enrollees comprise about one-quarter of the student body at West Virginia institutions. This is not an ideal test, because the state's largest university, WVU, substantially increased other scholarship opportunities for out-of-state students during the sample period in an explicit attempt to increase out-of-state enrollments. (note that due to the small number of clusters, critical values are taken from the relevant small-sample T distribution rather than the standard normal). All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score.
a. For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled, b. I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment.
If these other scholarships attracted higher-quality out-of-state students over time, or had impacts of their own, this biases against finding positive impacts of PROM-ISE. I estimate the two-stage (IV) difference-in-difference equation:
where WV s is an indicator for whether the student was a West Virginia resident, P ist represents actual PROMISE receipt and represents predicted PROMISE receipt P ist based on the parameter estimates from Equation 4a. The IV estimates scale up the OLS estimates here by about 18 percent. 26 Column 4 of Table 4 presents these DD estimates. Virtually all of the point estimates shrink, and some lose significance as standard errors also increase. But the overall pattern is broadly consistent, and the differences in point estimates between Column 4 and Column 1 are almost all too small to be of any substantive importance (with school-year earnings being the exception). Moreover, if I add a linear time trend to this DD (not shown), the results are very similar to those in Column 3, confirming that while non-WV residents slightly increase in quality over time, there is no jump in their performance at the time of PROMISE implementation.
Finally, I perform a separate DD analysis in which I compare the changes for all students above the ACT threshold to changes among all those below the threshold (but who still had at least a 3.0 high school GPA). This test is also imperfect because students far below the threshold may not be a good comparison group for those far above it; indeed, this is the motivation for the RD analysis. In any case, these estimates (presented in Column 5 of Table 4 ) are generally similar to (and often larger than) the basic estimates, indicating that the changes for those above the threshold are not mirrored by similar changes for ineligible students below the threshold.
In contrast to other studies which have founded stronger effects of achievement incentives for women (for example, Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2009; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009), I find strikingly similar effects regardless of gender. These estimates and additional outcomes for the full sample (such as major choice, for which there is no effect) are available from the author on request.
Though the cohort analysis and RD estimate two separate parameters (average treatment effects for all those receiving PROMISE versus local effects for those just above the test score cutoff), they generate a strikingly similar pattern of results (with the exception of student employment, which shows no reduction in the RD). I conclude that the cohort analysis provides credible and even conservative estimates of the program's impact. Because average treatment effects are more policy-relevant than the local estimates from the RD, from this point forward I focus primarily on the cohort analysis results.
Table 4
Cohort Analysis Robustness Checks or p Ͻ 0.01 level (note that due to the small number of clusters, critical values are taken from the relevant small-sample T distribution rather than the standard normal). All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. Column 2 includes an indicator for private high school graduates and an indicator for those whose high school public/private status was missing, as well as a set of indicators for each WV county of residence.
a. For students who drop out, cumulative GPA is imputed as the cumulative GPA when last enrolled. b. I calculate average weekly earnings based on the four quarters of school year employment data that are available for all cohorts, corresponding to the spring of the second (sophomore) year, the spring and fall of the third year, and the fall of the fourth year following enrollment.
IV. Bounding the Potential Bias Due to Selection
It is fair to ask whether the results above could be biased by differential selection, given that an explicit goal of the program was to increase in-state enrollment among qualified students. Yet the potential for nonrandom selection need not make the evaluation problem intractable; Manski (1995) , Lee (2009) , and others suggest methods for bounding selection which influence the approach I take below. To understand how selection may bias the findings presented above, recall the before-after model as specified in Equation 2. The concern is that those who enter the sample as "eligible enrollees" after the implementation of PROMISE may be different from eligible enrollees who entered the sample in earlier cohorts. Any differences captured by the covariates in X i (including gender, race/ethnicity, age at entry, ACT score and high school GPA) can be controlled, but other differences may remain. To control for these remaining differences, one would ideally like to include in all regressions an indicator of whether the student was induced by PROMISE to become an eligible enrollee, instead estimating:˜ỹ
where Z i is equal to 1 if the student was induced to become an eligible enrollee because of PROMISE, and zero otherwise. 27 The coefficient estimates how different these marginal enrollees are from intramarginal enrollees, after controlling for other observable characteristics.
If at least some students are induced to become eligible enrollees because of the program, and these students are different in unobservable ways ( Ͼ 0), then the estimated from Equation 5 will not converge to the true . If X i were completelŷ␤ ␤ orthogonal to Z i (that is, if none of the covariates were useful proxies for Z i ) then:␤
In words, Equation 6 says that the size and magnitude of the bias will depend on two factors: 1) what fraction of eligible enrollees who are "marginal," that is, induced to become eligible enrollees by PROMISE, and 2) how different marginal enrollees are from intramarginal enrollees (as measured by the parameter ). This is an upper bound on the potential bias; it will be smaller to the extent that the covariates in X i help proxy for the unobserved Z i . In this section, I first estimate Equation 1 using publicly available enrollment trend data, and then test the sensitivity of the main findings to varying assumptions about Equation 2.
To estimate the impact of PROMISE on eligible enrollment, Figure 6 plots four different college enrollment rates for WV high school graduates: the percent enrolling in a public WV institution as a PROMISE-eligible student, the percent enrolling in a public WV institution as a PROMISE-ineligible student, the percent enrolling in a WV private institution, and the percent enrolling in an out-of-state
Figure 6 Fall Enrollment Rates of Recent West Virginia High School Graduates
Source: Author's calculations using WVHEPC data and publicly available statistics; see text for details.
institution. 28 The figure and later, 15 would have met the initial requirements and enrolled in a public WV institution with or without the scholarship, while four to five (20 to 25 percent) appear to be "marginal" enrollees.
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Figure 6 also provides some information about where these marginal enrollees came from, and where they did not. Between 2001 and 2002, the out-of-state enrollment rate declined by 1.2 percentage points. If one assumes that this entire decrease represents students switching to WV public institutions as eligible enrollees, then one-quarter to one-third of marginal enrollees were induced from out-of-state. The percentage may be much lower if some of those induced from out-of-state decided to use their PROMISE scholarship at a WV private institution (private WV enrollment does tick upward in 2002). These are the students most likely to create a positive bias, so it is reassuring that they cannot account for more than a third of the enrollment increase, or more than 6 percent ‫)02/2.1ס(‬ of all PROMISE-eligible enrollees.
It is impossible to identify in the data precisely who these 6 percent are, but one approach to bounding, following Lee (2009) , is to make the extreme assumption that these marginal students represent the top 6 percent of values for a given outcome and then reestimate the effects with these top values excluded. But in the case where multiple, related outcomes are available, Lee (2009) bounds, which were designed for the case of a single outcome, can be too conservative. In the present case, it is empirically impossible for marginal students to simultaneously represent the top 6 percent of values for every outcome of interest. For example, the top 6 percent of PROMISE recipients by cumulative college GPA had a five-year graduation rate of only 83 percent (not 100 percent), a four-year graduation rate of 68 percent (not 100 percent), and accumulated an average of only 118 credits (which is just below the median, not the 94th percentile of credit accumulation).
Thus, instead of throwing out the top 6 percent of treatment-group values for each outcome individually, I reestimate the effects for all outcomes after "trimming" the treatment group (the after cohorts) based on the 94th percentile of a key outcome, here either cumulative GPA (3.90 or above) or cumulative credits earned (149 or above). The results are shown in Table 5 . Column 1 restates the baseline estimates for comparison, and Columns 2 and 3 provide the adjusted estimates after trimming the sample. Even under this rather extreme assumption, the coefficients shrink but generally remain above zero, and several key impacts retain significance, including the effects on first year outcomes, school-year earnings, meeting the 120 credit threshold, and earning a BA within four years. Interestingly, trimming based on cumulative outcomes over four years has virtually no effect on the estimated effect on first year credits, which is arguably the outcome most proximal to the policy (because most students were meeting the 2.75 GPA threshold even prior to PROM-ISE; and recall that 25 percent of recipients lost the scholarship after the first year). Note that this analysis only examines the effects of positive selection; if one made similarly extreme assumptions about negatively-selected marginal students (those 30. While this clearly limits the potential for compositional change, it is still a sizable enrollment effect. This estimate is slightly higher than Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) find for Georgia HOPE, and comparable to Dynarski's (2002) estimate for seven state programs.
Table 5
Bounding Exercise Outcome (note that due to the small number of clusters, critical values are taken from the relevant small-sample T distribution rather than the standard normal). All regressions include indicator controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and GPA squared, and indictors for each ACT score. The proportion of the sample that is trimmed, 6 percent, is calculated based on an analysis of the enrollment shifts displayed in Figure 6 . I then identify the set of students in the "after" cohorts with the top 6 percent of values on either cumulative GPA (equivalent to a 3.90 or above) after four years or cumulative credits earned after four years (149 credits or above), respectively, and reestimate the effects with these students excluded.
who otherwise would not have enrolled at all or would have enrolled with an ACT score below the cutoff), the net effect of selection may well be a downward rather than upward bias. If PROMISE were a traditional grant with no strings attached, there would be no reason to expect the impacts on course credits or GPAs to be concentrated around the annual GPA and credit thresholds for renewal. Yet this is precisely what is observed, at least in the case of course credits. Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of credits attempted in each year of college, by entry cohort. For the two precohorts, the CDFs are basically smooth. For the two PROM-ISE cohorts in the first three years of college, the CDFs shift to the right and a clear kink is visible just below the renewal threshold of 30 credits. The kink demonstrates the shift from below 30 to just above 30 credits, and indicates that impacts are concentrated among those students who were below, but still within striking distance of the threshold. Figure 8 presents CDFs for college GPAs. GPAs are clearly higher for the PROM-ISE cohorts in the first three years. There are no clear kinks in the GPA distributions around the annual renewal thresholds, but the distributions appear slightly bowed with the largest before-after differences found near the thresholds. The absence of clear kinks is not surprising given that students cannot manipulate their GPAs as precisely as their course loads.
Tellingly, these patterns disappear in the fourth (senior) year, when students still receive PROMISE funds but no longer face specific incentives regarding course load or GPA, because the scholarship cannot be renewed for a fifth year. The distribution of credits remains slightly shifted to the right, but there is no longer a kink at the threshold. The GPA distribution among PROMISE cohorts becomes virtually indistinguishable from that of the precohorts, with the PROMISE cohorts perhaps even falling slightly behind. 32 The change in pattern is not due to a dropoff in the number of PROMISE recipients: nearly 85 percent of those who received PROMISE in their third year also received it in their fourth.
In Table 6 , I quantify the differences shown in these figures. I estimate impacts on the percentage meeting the renewal thresholds in each year, using the cohort analysis OLS specification as well as an IV approach to account for declining 31. One can perform a similar analysis of differential selection above and below the test score cutoffs in the RD approach, to arrive at a similar conclusion. For the sake of brevity, I focus on bounding the cohort analysis estimates since they provide the more interesting policy parameter (average effects versus estimates local to the ACT threshold). 32. I examine annual GPA rather than cumulative GPA in the fourth year because the cumulative GPA is mostly predetermined by actions in Years 1-3. The annual GPA thus represents a cleaner test of students' responses to the removal of the incentives. (note that due to the small number of clusters, critical values are taken from the relevant small-sample T distribution rather than the standard normal). All regressions use the basic before-after specification and include controls for gender, race/ethnicity, age, high school GPA and ACT score (or equivalent). a. I present both cumulative and annual GPAs. PROMISE renewal is contingent upon cumulative GPAs in the first three years; but because the cumulative GPA in Year 4 is mostly determined by behavior prior to Year 4, it does not reveal behavioral changes as clearly as the annual GPA measure. b. In Year 1, the cumulative and annual GPA measures are not identical because of slight differences in how certain courses (such as transfer and/or remedial courses) are counted. For students not enrolled in a given year, annual GPA is first imputed as the semester GPA if the student enrolled for at least one semester, otherwise it is imputed as the cumulative GPA as of last enrollment.
PROMISE receipt in each year of college. 33 The results show that PROMISE recipients are 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to complete 30 or more credits in each of the first three years, but the impact is only eight percentage points in the fourth year. Similarly, PROMISE recipients are six to eight percentage points more likely to exceed the cumulative GPA thresholds in each of the first three years, but in the senior year the impact on (annual) GPA disappears completely.
One alternative explanation is that students in the fourth year of college do not need to take 30 credits because they are closer than that to graduation. This could account for some of the dropoff between junior and senior year impacts. But even among students who received PROMISE for all four years, only 60 percent graduated in four years, and only one in five graduated in four years without taking at least 30 credits in the final year. It thus seems unlikely that senior year course loads are much limited by the prospect of imminent graduation. This explanation also cannot explain the falloff in fourth year grades.
It is possible that some of the falloff in fourth year grades could be due to backloading of difficult courses. Students' ability to respond in this way is limited, however, by the fact that difficult courses are often prerequisites, which must be taken early in college; it is the upper-level classes that tend have higher grades. The GPA requirement for scholarship renewal is lower in the freshman year (2.75) in part for this very reason, which further dilutes any incentive to put off hard classes. Empirically, the most difficult year to meet the GPA requirement is the sophomore year (see first column of Table 6 ), but it may be difficult to delay these courses for two years. While these sorts of nonproductive responses cannot be completely ruled out, it is worth noting that the combination of both course-load and GPA requirements, and the fact that the incentives are in place for three consecutive years, limits the opportunities for pure gaming.
B. Are Impacts Limited to Students with High Financial Need?
Another way to test whether the effects are driven by income or incentive effects is to examine subgroups with differing levels of financial constraint. The behavioral incentives of PROMISE should apply similarly to rich and poor students. Richer students may, however, be less financially constrained and thus less sensitive to reductions in the cost of college. 34 Because family income data are not available, I generate subgroups using two proxies for need: first, the student's Pell Grant status, and next, the poverty rate of the student's high school county. 33. For the IV approach, "after" is used as an instrument for PROMISE receipt in the freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior years, respectively. 34. Note that the two primary sources of need-based aid for WV college students-Pell grants and WV Higher Education Grants-are generally unaffected by PROMISE receipt, so rich and poor students have equal amounts of funding staked on the achievement incentives. 35. Both before and after the introduction of PROMISE, about 31 percent of eligible enrollees received Pell Grants, which generally go to students with family incomes of $40,000 or less. I split counties into three groups based on 2004 poverty rates: over 20 percent, between 15 and 20, and less than 15 percent. The cohort analysis is run for each of the five subgroups separately.
Under the preferred specification (the cohort analysis IV), I find no evidence of larger impacts for higher-need subgroups (results available on request).
36 PROMISE appears to improve outcomes for students across the income spectrum. It should be noted that these are only weak tests that in no way refute the possibility of credit constraints. Even students who are relatively "low-need" may face constraints that are relaxed by PROMISE, while some "high-need" students may remain significantly constrained even with PROMISE. Still, the finding that impacts are not concentrated among the neediest students is suggestive that cost-of-college effects are not the sole mechanism driving the results.
C. Do programs of similar value but with different incentives generate different effects?
If large financial incentives for college achievement work primarily by lowering the cost of college rather than by increasing the rewards for student effort, then programs of similar value should have similar effects on enrollees even if the incentives are slightly different. The Georgia HOPE program provides a particularly instructive comparison. Georgia's HOPE scholarship was the early model for many subsequent state programs, including PROMISE. The two programs are of similar monetary value (both cover tuition and fees), and both require students to maintain a 3.0 GPA while in college (although PROMISE allows a 2.75 GPA in the first year). But in Georgia there are no minimum course load requirements for renewal; students need not even attend full-time. While PROMISE accelerates students' course progression, HOPE apparently had the opposite effect. Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find that HOPE recipients at Georgia's flagship university were 9.3 percentage points less likely to complete a full-time course load in their freshman year. Given the similar value of the scholarships, this is dramatically different from PROMISE's 25 percentage point increase the in the proportion of students completing a 30-credit course load in the first year. The difference suggests that students respond strategically to each program's incentives: Georgia's rules encouraged students to reduce course loads in order to raise their GPAs; West Virginia's 30-credit renewal requirement effectively eliminates this strategy for "gaming" the system.
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While HOPE may have slowed time-to-degree, Dynarski (2008) estimates that it (along with a similar program in Arkansas) increased the eventual BA completion rate among enrollees by three to five percentage points, which is comparable to the 3.7 percentage point impact on five-year graduation rates under PROMISE. It is thus 36. I also run the main RD specification for these subgroups. The RD suggests similar or even larger impacts for students coming from counties with lower poverty rates. For some outcomes (first-year credits and GPA), the RD suggests smaller impacts for Pell nonrecipients, but for other outcomes there is little difference (such as four-year graduation) and for some outcomes, the RD impacts are bigger for Pell nonrecipients (such as five-year graduation). 37. The 30-credit requirement also may reduce another form of gaming that was a concern under Georgia HOPE: Students might switch out of science and math courses in favor of more leniently grading subjects. But because many science/math courses are worth four credits instead of three, PROMISE does not provide a clear incentive here. I find that PROMISE had no impact on the proportion of students choosing to major in science or math at entry. possible that specific achievement incentives matter more for how students complete college rather than whether they complete college. (Note, however, that there are still substantial costs to extending time-to-degree.) These results are also consistent with several other findings from the literature: an evaluation of the Gates Millennium Scholars program, which provides large financial benefits but minimal academic requirements, finds limited effects on academic outcomes (DesJardins and McCall 2008 . Note that because the recipient population was academically elite, effects simply may have been limited by outcome ceilings.) Similarly, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) find that alleviating financial constraints alone does little to reduce dropout rates at a small private college in Kentucky. Finally, Garibaldi et al. (2007) find that on-time completion rates at one Italian institution rose after a policy was implemented to charge students more for enrolling beyond the expected completion time, although the policy did nothing to alleviate financial constraints.
VI. Discussion
I find that PROMISE has a significant impact on many end-of-college outcomes, with particularly large impacts on time-to-degree. Despite the potential for selection bias, a bounding exercise shows that the estimated impacts on several important outcomes would remain significantly above zero even in the presence of very extreme assumptions about marginal enrollees. Overall, including the estimated effects on initial enrollment, PROMISE increased the overall BA attainment rate (BA completers as a proportion of all individuals in an age cohort) by 1.8 to 2.3 percentage points depending on whether the five-year BA impact persists, which may seem modest in absolute terms, but comes on top of a baseline BA attainment rate in West Virginia of just 21.5 percent and represents a significant closing of the WV-national gap.
38,39 A full cost-benefit analysis is premature as graduates have just begun to enter the labor market. But in simple terms, PROMISE cost the state about $63 million and produced about 1,000 additional graduates over its first two cohorts, with approximately three-quarters of these graduates remaining in-state for at least six months after graduating (longer followup data not yet available).
An analysis of the mechanisms behind PROMISE's impact makes clear that incentives matter, and the details of incentive design can have big consequences. PROMISE likely would not have had the same impact, particularly on time-todegree, had it been designed as a traditional grant with no strings attached or different strings attached. This study also exposes an important (if obvious) explanation for delayed graduation: many students simply are not taking enough course credits each semester, beginning in the freshman year.
38. This assumes a stable high school graduation rate of 82 percent, a four percentage point impact on eligible enrollment among high school graduates, and a graduation impact of 3.7 percentage points among eligible enrollees. 39. Baseline BA attainment rate is from the American Community Survey 2005, based on WV residents aged 25-34, corresponding to the age cohorts just prior to PROMISE. The national rate for this age group is approximately 30 percent, so the gap closes by 21 to 27 percent.
While the cost-of-college effects of PROMISE appear insufficient to explain its impact, this hardly implies that costs are irrelevant. Perhaps the only reason why the incentives work is because students face credit constraints. 40 Moreover, cost-ofcollege effects may matter most for dimensions of behavior beyond those covered in the present analysis. Although I focus primarily on effects among college enrollees, I also find evidence that PROMISE increased the percent of high school graduates who enroll in West Virginia in the first place. The initial enrollment decision may be more sensitive to the cost-of-college effects of PROMISE. The scholarship also reduced student loan debt, which could affect post-graduation decisions (Field 2009; Rothstein and Rouse 2007) .
Of course, financial aid policy is not the only means of affecting collegiate attainment, and even with large incentives, many students still fail to graduate or fail to graduate on time. Still, the findings here suggest that incentives tied to minimum course loads (not just GPAs) may be one promising tool for increasing educational attainment and speeding time-to-degree.
